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Abstract. From the viewpoint of the independence axiom of expected utility
theory, an interesting empirical dynamic choice problem involves the presence of a
“global risk”, that is, a chance of losing everything whichever safe or risky option is
chosen. In this experimental study, participants have to allocate real money between
a safe and a risky project. Treatment variable is the particular decision stage at which
a global risk is resolved: (i) before the investment decision; (ii) after the investment
decision but before the resolution of the investment risk; (iii) after the resolution of
the investment risk. The baseline treatment is without global risk. Our goal is to
investigate the isolation effect and the principle of timing independence under the
different timing options of the global risk. In addition, we examine the role played
by anticipated and experienced emotions in the choice problem. Main findings are a
violation of the isolation effect, and support for the principle of timing independence.
Although behavior across the different global risk cases shows similarities, we observe
clear differences in people’s affective responses. This may be responsible for the
conflicting results observed in earlier experiments. Dependent on the timing of the
global risk different combinations of anticipated and experienced emotions influence
decision making.
Keywords: emotions, investment, global-risk, background risk, laboratory experi-
ment, regret, anxiety
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1. Introduction
Real life situations of decision making under uncertainty, like invest-
ment, often involve compound lotteries with multiple options and a
significant timing element. In contrast, most economic experiments
that study such behavior in the lab are limited to simple, static and
binary lotteries. From the viewpoint of the independence axiom of ex-
pected utility theory, an interesting dynamic choice problem concerns
the presence of an independent “global risk”, that is, a chance of losing
everything whichever safe or risky option is chosen.1
Ample experimental evidence exists showing a behavioral shift to-
wards risk seeking if a common probability is factored into the lot-
teries of a binary choice problem - the common ratio effect (Allais,
1953; Camerer, 1995). Interestingly, there is also some evidence sug-
gesting that this shift does not occur in case of compound lotteries
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2where the common component of the risk of losing is presented sep-
arately (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Cubitt et al., 1998). This has
been explained by the isolation effect, according to which people ignore
(transparent) common components of alternatives. In the experiments
examining the isolation effect an individual has to commit to a choice to
be made conditional on a prior act of nature (the resolution of the global
risk). Cubitt et al. (1998) compare this precommitment choice problem
with the case where the resolution of the global risk is preceding the
choice. They find a significant difference in behavior between these two
cases, violating the dynamic choice principle of timing independence.
However, this does not exhaust the possibilities for the timing of a
global risk. Bosman and van Winden (2005) experimentally investigate
investment if the resolution of the global risk takes place after (instead
of before) the resolution of the risky option. Surprisingly, they find that
people invest less than in the absence of a global risk, which violates
the isolation effect.
Because of the theoretical significance of the independence axiom, it
is important to check the robustness of these findings and the underly-
ing determinants. Regarding the latter, one interesting factor pointed
at in various theoretical analyses, but typically not accounted for in
economic experiments, concerns the impact of affect (see Loewenstein
et al., 2001). In a number of theories of risky choice, the anticipation
of future feelings is assumed to influence the behavior of the decision
makers, such as regret (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982), disap-
pointment (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986), and anxiety (Wu,
1999; Caplin and Leahy, 2001). It is an empirical question whether
indeed emotions are anticipated and taken into account and, if so,
whether the anticipation is correct (Zeelenberg, 1999). More partic-
ularly, it is important to know which emotions are anticipated. In ad-
dition to anticipated emotions also experienced emotions can influence
decision making under risk. Feelings are frequently claimed to influence
investors (see e.g. Sacco et al. (2003) on the emotional impact of global
terrorism on investment). Good and bad moods appear to influence
risk behavior in laboratories (Isen, 2001) and in the real world (Kliger
and Levy, 2003). Furthermore, induced anxiety appears to increase in-
dividuals’ preferences for low-risk/low-reward options (Raghunathan
and Pham, 1999). If indeed the anticipation of emotional states is
not perfect, actually experienced emotions may influence behavior in
a way that is not foreseen by the decision maker, facilitating time
inconsistencies. To get to know these effects, a thorough analysis of
both anticipated and experienced emotions related to decision making
under risk and uncertainty is needed.
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The purpose of this experimental study is to investigate (1) the iso-
lation effect and timing independence under all possible timing options
of a global risk, and (2) the role played by anticipated and experienced
emotions in the related choice problems. Our main findings are a vi-
olation of the isolation effect, which differs from the one observed by
Bosman and van Winden (2005), and support for the principle of timing
independence. Although behavior across the different global risk cases
shows similarities, we observe clear differences in people’s affective re-
sponses which may be responsible for the conflicting results observed in
earlier experiments. Dependent on the situation, different combinations
of anticipated and experienced emotions appear to influence decision
making.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experi-
mental design and procedures. Section 3 shows our findings concerning
investment behavior, affective responses, and the relation between the
two. Section 4 addresses some differences between our findings and
earlier evidence using the results of additional experiments. Section 5
concludes.
2. Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1. Experimental Design
Our baseline treatment concerns the following choice problem. Each
participant in the experiment is endowed with an amount of money z
that s/he has to allocate (once and for real) to two options, one of which
is safe while the other is risky. The amount allocated to the safe option
is returned with certainty, yielding neither gains nor losses. The risky
option returns 2.5 times the amount invested with probability p = 1/2,
and returns nothing with probability (1− p) = 1/2. In the sequel, the
probability p will be called the decision risk, while only the money that
is allocated to the risky option (x) will be called investment.2
This Baseline treatment will be compared with several other treat-
ments where we add a variously timed global risk, that is, a chance
(q = 1/3) that the participant faces a zero return from both options
whatever the investment decision was (implying zero earnings from the
experiment). Three possibilities exist with respect to the timing of the
resolution of the global risk (for the decision trees, see Figure 1):
(1) GR-Pre: the global risk is resolved before the investment deci-
sion. If the risk materializes, the participant loses the endowment and
gets no further chance of gaining money.
(2) GR-Inter: the resolution of the global risk occurs after the in-
vestment decision but before the resolution of the decision risk (p). If
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4the risk materializes, the participant loses the endowment allocated to
the two options, without learning the outcome of the decision risk.
(3) GR-Post: the global risk is resolved after the investment decision
and the resolution of the decision risk. If the risk materializes, all the
returns from both the safe option and the risky option are lost.
According to classical expected utility theory (EU), the existence of a
global risk should not influence investment. Theories including a prob-
ability weighting function, e.g. rank-dependent utility theory (RDU)
and cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (Quiggin, 1982; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992), can predict changes in behavior under global risk.
In these theories the common risk does not cancel out and using an
inverse-S shaped probability weighting function, we should observe
more investment under global risk. This being the case if the refer-
ence point is taken as either zero or z. Both RDU and CPT would
predict no difference between GR-Inter and GR-Post. In case of GR-
Pre, according to CPT (e.g. for a loss aversion parameter of λ = 2) we
might expect less investment compared to Baseline if a “lucky draw”
will shift the reference point from zero to z. If we allow for different
probability weighting functions, dependent on the affective strength of
the situation (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001), we might expect more
investment for the more affect-rich situation. Finally dependent on the
chosen utility function, RDU and CPT can predict intermediate invest-
ment while classical EU (of wealth) predicts full investment. For a more
detailed discussion of the application of these theories to our investment
situation, see the formal discussion in Bosman and van Winden (2005).
As mentioned in the introduction, the existing experimental evi-
dence is puzzling. While some results are in line with EU, showing no
effect, other results have shown that, under certain conditions, global
risk can lead to more investment (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), less
investment (Bosman and van Winden, 2005) or leave investment un-
changed (Cubitt et al., 1998). Our conjecture is, that different affective
reactions might be held responsible for this.
To investigate the occurrence and influence of emotions during the
experiment both experienced and anticipated emotions are measured,
using self-reports.3 The role of the following emotions is investigated:
anxiety, regret, rejoicing, disappointment, hope, irritation, surprise,
sadness, and happiness. We further measure anxiety as a trait because
of its hypothesized importance in case of uncertainty. For an overview
of the kind and timing of these measures, see Table I and Figure 2,
respectively.
To gauge anxiety we use the well known Spielberger state/trait-
anxiety inventory, abbreviated as STAI (Spielberger et al., 1970). It
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Figure 1. Decision trees for Baseline, GR-Inter, GR-Pre and GR-Post
is considered to be an “excellent measure of both types [state and
trait] of anxiety” (Kline, 1993) and is widely used. A general score
is computed from the detailed answers to a series of questions (see
Appendix A.1.1), which represents either the general disposition for
anxiety (trait scale) or the anxiety experienced at the moment when
the questionnaire is filled out (state scale). In the experiment, trait
anxiety (ANXIETY-trait) is measured before participants get into the
lab, while state anxiety is measured immediately before (ANXIETY-1)
and after (ANXIETY-2) the investment decision.
Based on the existing psychological evidence a negative influence of
(anticipated) state anxiety on risk taking is predicted. Furthermore, as
people with a stronger disposition for anxiety are more likely to expe-
rience and to anticipate this emotion, greater risk aversion is expected
from participants with a higher anxiety trait score.
Regret, rejoicing, and disappointment are measured in three differ-
ent ways (for details, see Appendix A.2). First, we ask for the regret
and rejoicing participants anticipated when making their investment
decision4 (represented by the variables REGRET-A (B) and REJOICE-
A (B) and the relative measures REGRET-R = REGRET-A −
REGRET-B and REJOICE-R = REJOICE-B− REJOICE-A).5 Where
the A (B) indicates that these emotions might lead to more investment
in option A (B). Then, participants are asked to imagine a hypothetical
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6Table I. Emotion measures used in the experiment.
A. Anxiety (see Appendix A.1.1)
Variable name: Moment of measure: Comments:
ANXIETY-trait Before start of experiment. General disposition to anxiety.
ANXIETY-1 Before decision was made. Experienced anxiety prior to decision.
ANXIETY-2 After decision was made. Experienced anxiety after decision.
B. Regret, rejoicing and disappointment (see Appendix A.2)
B.1. Anticipated regret and rejoicing
Variable name: Moment of measure: Comments:
REGRET-A After decision was made Regret as motivation for project A.
REGRET-B After decision was made Regret as motivation for project B.
REJOICE-A After decision was made Rejoicing as motivation for project A.
REJOICE-B After decision was made Rejoicing as motivation for project B.
B.2. Relative measure of regret (rejoicing)
Variable name: Moment of measure: Comments:
REGRET-R After decision was made REGRET-A - REGRET-B
REJOICE-R After decision was made REJOICE-B - REJOICE-A
REGRET-E After decision was made. Estimation of regret
DISAPP-E After decision was made. Estimation of disappointment
REGRET-X After outcome was known. Experienced regret after outcome.
DISAPP-X After outcome was known. Experienced disappoint. after outcome.
C. General emotions (see Appendix A.3.2)
Variable name: Moment of measure: Comments:
EMOTION After decision was made. Importance of emotions for decision
HOPE-1 Before decision was made. Experienced hope (irritation)
IRRITATE-1 before the decision.
scenario where they lose their invested money because of a negative out-
come of the risky project. Participants have to indicate their estimated
level of regret (REGRET-E) and disappointment (DISAPP-E) using an
indirect measure adopted from Zeelenberg et al. (1998). The items of
this measure have been found to be significantly correlated with the two
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Figure 2. Time-line of emotion measures and their respective point of reference.
emotions. Because of the quick succession of the two questions regard-
ing regret, this indirect measure is chosen, to minimize the chance that
participants try to be consistent in their answers. Finally, experienced
regret (REGRET-X) and disappointment (DISAPP-X) are measured
when the outcome of both risks is known. These allow us to investigate
how well people forecast their future emotional state (Loewenstein and
Schkade, 1999).
Before the investment decision is taken, we also measure the experi-
ence of some other emotions (see Appendix A.3), in particular hope and
irritation because of their specific relevance for the situation at hand
(HOPE-1, IRRITATE-1). Although the valence of these experienced
emotions is different, we expect both of them to have a positive effect
on investment. However if irritation is not of the aggressive type but
related to anxiety it would rather follow the latter’s action tendency
of promoting risk aversion; (see Leith and Baumeister, MacLeod and
Byrne, 1996, 1996).
Because participants take only one decision, we will analyze the
role of emotions in the different treatments from an inter-individual
(between-subjects) perspective. Although a within-subjects design is
attractive to examine treatment effects, in this case we prefer a between-
subjects design to avoid any confounding effects of the decision problem6
and spillover effects of experienced emotions.
2.2. Experimental procedures
Upon entering the reception room, participants were handed the
ANXIETY-trait questionnaire, which they filled out in quiet. When
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8everybody had finished, the participants were requested to randomly
draw a seat number for the laboratory and to put a sticker with that
number on the (nameless) questionnaire before handing it in and en-
tering the lab. In the analysis responses to the questionnaire could be
linked to data obtained in the lab (only) through the seat number.
In this way, anonymity was maintained. In the lab, each participant
received an envelope with 15 euro in coins and bills as working money
for the experiment. Participants were told that if they would lose some
of their money in the experiment they would have to pay back the
amount of the loss after the session (keeping the rest), while earnings
in excess of their working money would be paid out to them on top of
the 15 euro. After checking the content of their envelope, participants
received the instructions, which were handed out and read aloud by
the experimenter (for a translation, see Appendix B.2). In the instruc-
tions participants were informed that they would have to allocate their
working money to two projects, one of which had a certain return
(no gains, no losses), while the other had a probability of p = 1/2 to
return 2.5 times the amount invested and a probability of (1−p) = 1/2
to return nothing. Furthermore, they were told that they would have
to determine the outcome of the risky project themselves, by rolling a
dice under supervision. In the treatments with the global risk (GR-Pre,
GR-Inter, GR-Post) they were additionally informed that they were to
face a risk of q = 1/3 to lose all their money from the experiment
(see Appendix B.1.2). The resolution of this global risk would again
be determined by themselves, by rolling another dice under super-
vision. After an opportunity for raising questions, participants went
individually through the computerized questions of the experiment.
The first set of questions concerned the intensity with which they
experienced the emotions of anxiety (ANXIETY-1), hope (HOPE-1),
and irritation (IRRITATE-1), at that very moment. Subsequently, they
were asked to fill in the amounts of money they would like to allocate to
the projects A and B (the fraction invested in project B will be labelled
INVESTMENT). The amounts could be any multiple of 50 eurocent
and had to add up to 15 euro. In the treatment GR-Pre this was
preceded by the dice roll resolving the global risk.7 After the investment
decision, participants were asked to record the anxiety they experienced
now that they had made their investment decision but before knowing
the outcome of the still to be resolved risk(s) (ANXIETY-2). This was
followed by the question whether they had taken their future emotions
into account when they made their decision (EMOTION) and, more
specifically, to which extent the anticipation of regret and rejoicing
influenced their decision (REGRET-A[B], REJOICE-A[B]). Next, they
were asked to estimate the extent to which they would experience
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regret and disappointment in case they lost their money in the risky
project (REGRET-E, DISAPP-E). Finally, participants were requested
to confirm their decision, with an option to alter it if they wanted.8
The experimenters went then through the lab to have the private
decision risk resolved by the dice roll and to record the result. In the
treatment GR-Inter this was preceded by the dice roll resolving the
global risk, while in GR-Post this happened after the resolution of
the decision risk. Note, however, that in GR-Inter the decision risk
was not resolved for those who lost everything. The experiment ended
with a debriefing questionnaire including the question whether the
participant experienced regret (REGRET-X) about the decision taken
or disappointment (DISAPP-X) about the outcome. Participants were
then paid out in private. If earnings were less than their working money
they were required to pay back the difference.
The experiment took about one hour. All sessions took place in
the CREED-laboratory of the University of Amsterdam. Participants
were recruited from various fields of study, and in total 192 students
participated in the experiment. They received 2.50 euro as show-up fee,
and on average their total earnings were 16.80 euro (approximately $
20.20).
3. Behavioral Results
3.1. Compound Independence and the Isolation Effect
An important implication of the independence axiom of rational choice
theory, when applied to two-stage lotteries, is compound independence.
This axiom states that: the two-stage lottery A yielding with probabil-
ity α a ticket for lottery X and with probability 1−α a ticket for lottery
Z, is preferred to the two-stage lottery B, which is the same as A with
Y instead of X, if and only if the one-stage lottery X is preferred to the
one-stage lottery Y (i.e. A = (X,α;Z, (1−α)) º B = (Y, α;Z, (1−α))
if and only if X º Y ; see Segal (1990)). Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
found experimental support for this axiom, using a two-stage choice
problem similar to our treatment GR-Inter (with the resolution of the
global risk resolved after the decision is made but before the resolution
of the decision risk). For explanation, they suggested the existence of
an editing phase in decision making where (transparent) common com-
ponents of alternatives are cancelled – the isolation effect. Several other
experimental studies reported corroborating evidence for this effect
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Conlisk,
1989; Bernasconi, 1994). Because these studies either used hypothetical
Hopfensitz_van-Winden.tex; 8/02/2007; 14:27; p.9
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Figure 3. INVESTMENT in Baseline and GR-Inter.
payoffs or a random lottery incentive system, one may be sceptical
concerning the evidence.9 However Cubitt et al. (1998), using mone-
tary incentives in a carefully designed experiment, arrived at the same
conclusion, that is, that the isolation effect holds.
In all these experimental studies people are confronted with a two-
stage choice problem similar to GR-Inter, but they are restricted to a
binary choice (for either the safe or the risky option). Our design differs
in this respect, by allowing participants to allocate their money to the
two projects in whatever proportion they like, which resembles more
the adjustment of a portfolio of assets. Therefore, we focus first on the
treatments Baseline and GR-Inter, to investigate the robustness of the
isolation effect. For the decision trees of the respective choice problems
we refer to Figure 1.
3.1.1. Investment: GR-Inter vs. Baseline
Figure 3 presents the distributions of the investment choices. The dis-
tributions are clearly different. Whereas Baseline shows a mode at
half of the money being invested, the mode in GR-Inter is at full
investment. Furthermore, mean investment is 27% higher in GR-Inter
(0.662 vs. 0.521), and substantially more participants invest all their
money in that treatment (23% vs. 5%). Tests10 corroborate that the
distributions are different, with investment being higher in GR-Inter
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0.011; Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0.012).11
Thus, even though we took great care in making the global risk
very transparent (see Appendix B), we find evidence against compound
independence and the isolation effect.
RESULT 1. In GR-Inter investment is higher and more extreme than
in Baseline, violating compound independence. In contrast to other
studies we find no support for the isolation effect.
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Although these results cannot be explained by EU, they can be ex-
plained by RDU and CPT (excluding the isolation effect). Whether
these theories can also explain the results of the remaining treatments,
GR-Pre and GR-Post, we will see below. We first examine the role of
emotions in Baseline and GR-Inter.
3.1.2. The Role of Emotions
The question we want to address here is whether the investment level is
related to emotional disposition and anticipated and experienced emo-
tions when the decision was made. To that purpose, we employ a (Tobit)
regression model with INVESTMENT as the dependent variable, and
as independent variables: trait anxiety (ANXIETY-trait), anticipated
rejoicing (REJOICE-R)12, experienced anxiety (ANXIETY-1), hope
(HOPE-1), and irritation (IRRITATE-1).13 Based on the evidence re-
ferred to above, we hypothesize a negative impact of trait/state anxiety
and a positive impact of rejoicing, while no specific effect is predicted
for hope. The effect of irritation is expected to be positive, unless it is
a correlate of anxiety, in which case the predicted effect is negative.
As Table II shows, very similar regression results are obtained for
the two treatments. More specifically, none of the estimated coefficients
is different across treatments (F-test, p > 0.299). Joint estimation,
using a treatment dummy for GR-Inter, shows that GR-Inter furthers
investment (dummy coefficient: +0.130, p = 0.024). Our hypotheses
concerning the impact of emotions are partially confirmed. Interest-
ingly, hope shows a positive effect. Although perhaps intuitive, note
that a relationship between risk attitude and hopefulness could not be
confirmed by Chew and Ho (1994). As predicted, anticipation of more
relative rejoicing leads to higher investment. Substituting REGRET-
R for REJOICE-R leads to an opposite and weaker effect (coefficient:
−0.066, p = 0.026). Trait and state anxiety do not show a signifi-
cant impact on investment. The two variables are strongly correlated
(Spearman: 0.558, p = 0.000). However, even if one of them is left
out no significance is obtained. This is surprising in light of the psy-
chological evidence that anxiety influences risk taking. We will return
to this issue below. Interestingly, irritation is correlated with state
anxiety (Spearman: 0.244, p = 0.034) and shows a negative impact
on investment.
Thus, except for the level shift in investment, it appears that emo-
tions impact investment in a very similar way in Baseline and GR-Inter.
One of the reasons why investment is higher in GR-Inter is that ex-
perienced hope, which has the strongest influence in our regression
model, is higher in GR-Inter.14 Anticipated rejoicing does not differ
and irritation differs marginally.15 An indicator of higher arousal in
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Table II. Censored tobit regressions of investment on emotions.
Baseline Number of obs 37
LR χ2(5) 22.89
Prob > χ2 0.000
Cox Snell R2 0.461
INVESTMENT t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t|
ANXIETY-trait -0.004 0.005 0.433
ANXIETY-1 0.003 0.005 0.532
HOPE-1 0.249 0.057 0.000
IRRITATE-1 -0.100 0.052 0.062
REJOICE-R 0.108 0.031 0.001
Intercept -0.075 0.257 0.773
2 obs. left-censored; 2 obs. right-censored
GR-Inter Number of obs 39
LR χ2(5) 20.46
Prob > χ2 0.001
Cox Snell R2 0.408
INVESTMENT t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t|
ANXIETY-trait -0.003 0.007 0.728
ANXIETY-1 0.000 0.005 0.952
HOPE-1 0.169 0.067 0.016
IRRITATE-1 -0.121 0.050 0.022
REJOICE-R 0.126 0.038 0.002
Intercept 0.431 0.313 0.178
1 obs. left-censored; 9 obs. right-censored
GR-Inter concerns experienced anxiety when corrected for trait anxi-
ety (i.e., ANXIETY-1−ANXIETY-trait) which is higher in GR-Inter.16
There is some psychological evidence concerning lotteries (albeit with
hypothetical payoffs) suggesting that arousal is related to risk seeking
(Mano, 1994; Leith and Baumeister, 1996). If so, then this would help
explain the upward shift in investment in GR-Inter.
The next result summarizes our findings.
RESULT 2. From a multiple (Tobit) regression model it appears that
emotions have a clear and similar impact on investment in Baseline
and GR-Inter. The experience of hope and anticipated rejoicing further
investment. Anticipated regret and anticipated rejoicing are correlated,
with the former having an opposite and weaker effect on investment.
Neither trait anxiety nor state anxiety impact investment. However,
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the experience of irritation, which positively correlates with state anxi-
ety, has a negative influence. The higher intensity of hope and arousal
observed in GR-Inter helps explain the higher level of investment in this
treatment.
3.2. Timing Independence
According to Cubitt et al. (1998) the principle of timing independence
requires that “an agent, if required to precommit to an action to be
taken conditional on a prior act of nature, precommits to the action
which would be chosen if the moment of choice was delayed until after
that act of nature.” If this principle of rational choice theory holds,
people confronted with choice problems similar to GR-Inter and GR-
Pre (see the decision trees in Figure 1) should show identical investment
behavior. However, in their experimental study Cubitt et al. (1998)
find that the principle is violated, even though no significant difference
is observed between (in our terminology) Baseline and GR-Inter and
between Baseline and GR-Pre, respectively.17 The violation is due to
the combined effect of more risk seeking when the global risk is resolved
after the investment decision and less risk seeking when it is resolved
before this decision is taken, compared to the baseline without global
risk. Our treatments Baseline, GR-Inter, and GR-Pre are equivalent in
terms of decision trees, except that we do not restrict decision making
to a binary choice. Therefore, we want to see whether the principle of
timing independence is also violated in our case.
3.2.1. Investment: GR-Inter vs. GR-Pre
As announced in the instructions to the participants (see Appendix
B.2), in treatment GR-Pre the global risk was resolved before the
investment decision. Those who could continue were, on the face of it,
presented with the same decision problem as participants in Baseline.
The others, for whom the global risk draw was unfavorable, were asked
to answer the questions hypothetically, with no money to be earned.
Figure 4 presents the distribution of investment in GR-Pre (for those
that could continue because of a lucky draw).18
The distribution seems similar to GR-Inter and indeed, statisti-
cally, no difference in investment is found (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.247;
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0.312). Thus, contrary to Cubitt et al. (1998),
we find no evidence of a violation of timing independence. In line with
the results obtained by these authors, we also find no difference in
investment between GR-Pre and Baseline (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.117;
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0.454).
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Figure 4. INVESTMENT in GR-Pre.
RESULT 3. Investment in GR-Pre is similar to GR-Inter and to Base-
line. Contrary to Cubitt et al. (1998), no violation of timing indepen-
dence is observed.
Because RDU and CPT can also explain these outcomes, they survive
as explanatory theories of our results so far. Note with respect to CPT
that one has to assume here that no significant shift in reference point
has occurred in GR-Pre (from 0 to z), because this should have induced
less investment, according to this theory.
We want to point out some (qualitative) aspects differentiating the
three treatments, which adds a caveat to Result 3. This concerns the
shape of the investment distributions. The frequency of full investment
in GR-Pre (23%) is identical to GR-Inter (23%) but remarkably higher
than the frequency in Baseline (5%; Pearson χ2, p < 0.029). Moreover,
in GR-Pre as well as in GR-Inter full investment is also the mode.
Another concern relates to the role of emotions to which we turn next.
3.2.2. The Role of Emotions
Remarkably, the (Tobit) regression model of investment, which was
successfully employed for Baseline and GR-Inter, fails to reach signif-
icance for GR-Pre (χ2 = 0.152; see Table 4 in Appendix C). Only
anticipated rejoicing appears to have a (positive) effect on investment,
but weaker than in the previous two treatments (coefficient REJOICE-
R: +0.080, p = 0.024). Thus, even though, equality of the investment
distributions cannot be rejected, from an emotion point of view these
treatments nevertheless appear to be different. Three other differences
show up when we take a closer look at the remaining emotion variables
of the model: anxiety, hope, and irritation. First, while little variation is
observed in trait-anxiety19, more anxiety is experienced in GR-Pre than
in Baseline, as was found for GR-Inter.20 Apparently, global risk elicits
greater anxiety, independent of whether its resolution just happened or
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is about to take place soon. A similar difference is observed for hope,
with more hope being experienced in both global risk treatments.21 As
discussed for GR-Inter, higher arousal may have positively influenced
investment in GR-Pre. These additional findings in turn suggest that,
compared to Baseline, the global risk treatments are more alike in this
respect.
RESULT 4. GR-Pre cannot be explained with the regression model that
is successfully employed for Baseline and GR-Inter, showing that emo-
tions are not a mere correlate of investment. Only anticipated rejoicing
shows again a positive (but weaker) effect on investment.
While GR-Pre and GR-Inter resemble each other in some emotional
respects, they differ in others. This restricts our confidence in statistical
results ignoring emotions. Factors influencing emotional intensity (like
vividness or closeness) that have not been controlled for in experimental
studies so far may have affected the results. This sets an important
agenda for future research.
Another unexpected finding concerns predictions from the mood
maintenance hypothesis (see e.g. Isen and Simmonds, 1978). According
to this hypothesis people may become more risk averse when they are
happy, in order not to risk loosing their good mood (which has a positive
hedonic value). In case of GR-Pre this would suggest that people being
happy after surviving the global risk would invest less. Incidentally, this
might help explain the violation of timing independence observed by
Cubitt et al. (1998), because they indeed find that investment is less
when the global risk is resolved before making the choice between the
safe and the risky option. Unfortunately, they do not have the required
data on affect to test this. Surprisingly, we do not find that people
with a lucky draw in GR-Pre are happier.22 Moreover, happiness is not
correlated with investment (Spearman, 0.172, p = 0.244).23
3.3. Adding GR-Post
Our main findings so far are a violation of the isolation effect (with more
investment in GR-Inter than in Baseline), support for timing indepen-
dence (GR-Pre vs. GR-Inter), and evidence that, affectively, people do
not experience the various (global risk) treatments in the same way.
Furthermore, RDU and CPT survived as explanatory theories. We will
now check the robustness of these findings by adding the results of our
remaining treatment GR-Post (for its decision tree, see Figure 1).
Before we do so, we first extend Cubitt et al.’s definition of timing
independence to include the new timing of the global risk: an agent, if
required to precommit to an action to be taken conditional on a prior
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Figure 5. INVESTMENT in GR-Post.
act of nature, precommits to the action which would be chosen if the
moment of choice was delayed until after that act of nature or if the
act of nature were to be delayed till after the outcome of the action.
Furthermore, note that from the perspective of RDU and CPT in-
vestment in GR-Post should be the same as in GR-Inter. This suggests
that we should also observe higher investment in GR-Post, compared to
Baseline.24 On the other hand, Bosman and van Winden (2005) found
lower investment in their treatment where the global risk was resolved
after the resolution of the decision risk, a result that flies in the face
of both RDU and CPT. Because our design seems to differ only in the
use of more extensive measures of emotions and in using euros instead
of guilders, a similar outcome is expected for GR-Post.
3.3.1. Investment across treatments
Figure 5 presents the distribution of investment in GR-Post. Surpris-
ingly, in our case, investment is clearly not smaller when compared to
Baseline (see Figure 3). Although mean investment is even higher in
GR-Post (0.62 vs. 0.52), statistically, we find only some weak evidence
of a difference with Baseline, and no evidence of a difference with GR-
Inter and GR-Pre (see Tables VIII and IX in Appendix C for the
statistics, concerning all treatments). Thus, also with this treatment
included, we find no violation of timing independence.
RESULT 5. Including GR-Post, we find no evidence of a difference in
the distribution of investment between the global risk treatments GR-
Pre, GR-Inter and GR-Post, supporting timing independence. However,
as observed for GR-Pre (Result 3), there is also no (clear) evidence of
a difference between Baseline and GR-Post in contrast with what is
observed for GR-Inter (Result 1). It appears that GR-Pre and GR-Post
are distribution-wise in between Baseline and GR-Inter.
Hopfensitz_van-Winden.tex; 8/02/2007; 14:27; p.16
Dynamic Choice, Independence and Emotions 17
Although, statistically, we observe only a difference between Baseline
and GR-Inter, remarkably, in all treatments involving global risk we
see a very similar proportion of full investment (circa 23%), which
is higher than in Baseline (Pearson χ2, p < 0.029).25 If we restrict
our attention to participants that invested only part of their work-
ing money (i.e., INVESTMENT < 1) we still observe some tendency
towards larger investment in GR-Inter (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.122;
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0.140), and no difference between Baseline
and the remaining global risk treatments. The higher observed means in
these treatments are mainly due to differences in participants choosing
full instead of intermediate investment.
Next, we will again turn to the role of emotions to examine how
people affectively experience the timing of the global risk, which can
help improve our understanding of the behavioral results.
3.3.2. Comparing the Role of Emotions
It turns out that our Tobit model of investment — successful in explain-
ing investment in Baseline and GR-Inter, but not in GR-Pre — is also
not significant for GR-Post (χ2 = 0.269; see Appendix C). The only
coefficient showing (weak) significance relates to experienced irritation,
and has a positive sign (coefficient: +0.130, p = 0.078).26 Also, only
in this treatment there is no clear effect of anticipated rejoicing as
measured by REJOICE-R (p = 0.119). We will return to this below.
For a better understanding of the differences across treatments, we
compare the role played by emotions in the various treatments (see
Tables III and IV).
One of our hypothesis is that the presence of global risk will lead to
higher experienced anxiety, compared to Baseline. While little variation
is observed in trait anxiety27, experienced anxiety is indeed higher in
GR-Pre, and GR-Inter (see Table III). Controlling for trait-anxiety by
looking at ANXIETY-difference (= ANXIETY-1 - ANXIETY-trait),
more anxiety is experienced in GR-Pre (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.028) and
GR-Inter (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.134, compared to Baseline and GR-
Post). Somewhat surprisingly, this does not apply to GR-Post, where
the resolution of the threat to lose all income is to take place at the very
end of the experiment. This suggests that anxiety is particularly elicited
if the global risk is either just experienced or is to be experienced in the
near(er) future. A similar outcome is obtained for hope. The experience
of hope is higher in GR-Pre (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.016) and GR-Inter
(Mann-Whitney, p < 0.075), compared to Baseline and GR-Post. This
suggests that even though behavior may seem similar in the presence
of global risk, treatments are affectively appraised as being different.
Whereas GR-Pre and GR-Inter clearly differ regarding the prospect of
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the global risk, they elicit hope and anxiety to a very similar degree. In
remarkable contrast, GR-Post appears to differ from GR-Inter in this
respect, even though the former seems only a slight variation of the
latter (which is neglected by RDU and CPT).
An interesting further difference between the treatments is found
with respect to the emotions regret, rejoicing and disappointment.
Since in GR-Inter global risk is resolved before the decision risk,
subjects will not learn in 1/3 of the cases if they made the “right”
decision or not. Thus, on average, the anticipation of regret and rejoic-
ing may be expected to be less related to investment in GR-Inter than
in GR-Post. Anticipation of regret (rejoicing) was measured through
questions about the importance of avoiding (seeking) regret (rejoicing)
when making the investment decision. For example, regarding project
A participants were requested to indicate to what extent the following
statements were applicable to them (similar questions for project B;
see Appendix A):
1. I did not put more money in B, because I did not want to feel really
bad when project B returns nothing (loses). [REGRET-A]
2. I did not put less money in A, because I will feel really good if
project B returns nothing (loses). [REJOICE-A]
From the answers we can see whether participants took the possi-
bility into account of (not) having to experience regret (rejoicing). Our
first observation is that the average scores for these questions are not
different across treatments.28 In all treatments, people report to have
thought to an equal degree about regret and rejoicing. However, not in
all treatments these answers are similarly related to their investment
decisions. Correlation coefficients show that the focus of regret and
rejoicing differed (see Table IV). For all treatments we observe that
REGRET-A is stronger correlated with investment than REGRET-B.
Thus, insofar as regret is concerned people always seem to focus more on
the safe project. Regarding rejoicing, though, there are variations across
treatments. In both Baseline and GR-Inter, REJOICE-A is stronger
correlated with investment than REJOICE-B, suggesting that in these
treatments the focus is more on the safe project when it comes to
rejoicing. This is in contrast with both GR-Pre and GR-Post where
rejoicing is mostly related to investment in project B. Furthermore,
note that in Baseline only REGRET-A is correlated with investment,
whereas in all treatments with global risk (also) some correlation with
REJOICE-B is observed.
We further find that regret is mostly correlated with investment in
treatments where these emotions can be prominent at the very end
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Table III. Averages experienced and estimated emotions (std. deviation in paren-
theses)
Baseline GR-Pre GR-Inter GR-Post
ANXIETY-trait 35.43 34.42 35.10 37.24
(8.26) (8.84) (7.18) (7.72)
ANXIETY-1 35.76 40.13 40.49 38.14
(7.29) (10.08) (11.94) (8.48)
ANXIETY-difference 0.32 5.71 5.39 0.91
(7.40) (9.55) (10.28) (9.14)
HOPE-1 2.95 3.35 3.28 3.02
(0.57) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64)
IRRITATE-1 1.46 1.40 1.85 1.57
(0.65) (0.64) (0.93) (0.80)
REGRET-A 2.65 2.70 2.80 2.75
(1.17) (1.18) (1.15) (1.11)
REJOICE-A 2.47 1.97 2.30 2.29
(1.18) (1.01) (1.08) (0.95)
REGRET-B 2.18 2.00 2.35 2.58
(1.13) (1.08) (1.14) (0.93)
REJOICE-B 2.88 3.03 2.75 3.17
(1.11) (1.01) (1.21) (0.82)
REGRET-E 6.16 5.42 5.69 5.98
(2.15) (2.28) (2.18) (2.05)
DISAPP-E 6.86 6.77 7.18 7.02
(2.17) (2.15) (1.73) (1.92)
REGRET-X 1.57 1.42 1.51 1.36
(0.80) (0.71) (0.76) (0.53)
DISAPP-X 1.92 2.13 2.49 2.40
(1.16) (1.18) (1.27) (1.19)
of the experiment. This singles out GR-Post, because here it is the
emotion of disappointment (about the resolution of the global risk)
that is prominent at the end. The ‘peak-end’ rule of memory may
play a role here (see Kahneman et al., 1993; Schreiber and Kahneman,
2000; Kahneman, 2000). This rule refers to the finding that strongest
intensity and final experience define the memory of the utility of a
situation. If this effect does not only exist for the creation of memory
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Table IV. Correlations of emotions.
A. (Spearman) correlation coefficients of investment with:
REGRET-A REJOICE-A
Baseline -0.554 p = 0.021 -0.377 p = 0.136
GR-Pre -0.432 p = 0.008 -0.304 p = 0.068
GR-Inter -0.528 p = 0.017 -0.707 p = 0.001
GR-Post -0.249 p = 0.241 -0.277 p = 0.190
REGRET-B REJOICE-B
Baseline -0.235 p = 0.364 0.134 p = 0.609
GR-Pre -0.303 p = 0.068 0.440 p = 0.006
GR-Inter 0.222 p = 0.347 0.383 p = 0.096
GR-Post 0.070 p = 0.744 0.530 p = 0.008
B. (Spearman) correlation coefficients of estimated and experienced:
disappointment regret
Baseline 0.200 p = 0.457 0.660 p = 0.005
GR-Pre -0.031 p = 0.885 0.410 p = 0.042
GR-Inter 0.252 p = 0.430 0.537 p = 0.072
GR-Post 0.349 p = 0.324 0.618 p = 0.057
but also for the anticipation of utility, this might explain our findings.
Comparing the situations of GR-Inter and GR-Post, through the timing
of the global risk, the former would generate more anxiety and hope
and a stronger focus on regret and rejoicing than the latter. Which is
what we observe. Although GR-Inter and GR-Post are equivalent in
RDU and CPT, affectively they are experienced as being different.
Responses to the question (posed after the investment decision) how
one would feel if the invested money would be lost with the resolution of
the decision risk show that estimated regret and disappointment for this
scenario (REGRET-E and DISAPP-E) do not differ across treatments
(Table III). Estimated regret is in all treatments correlated with actu-
ally experienced regret if the invested money was indeed lost.29 Because
the loss of invested money should be less related to disappointment, it is
not surprising that in all treatments we find no correlation of estimated
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and experienced disappointment (see Table IV: B).30 Interestingly, in
all cases experienced regret is overestimated.31
The next result summarizes our findings concerning GR-Post.
RESULT 6. As holds for GR-Pre, investment in GR-Post cannot be
explained with the regression model that helps explain behavior in Base-
line and GR-Inter. At the individual emotion level, anticipated rejoic-
ing is again found to be positively correlated with investment, but in
this case only if restricted to the rejoicing anticipated from taking risk
(REJOICE-B). Furthermore, experienced irritation appears to be pos-
itively related to investment, in contrast with Baseline and GR-Inter
(negative correlation) and GR-Pre (no correlation). The experienced
amount of hope and anxiety is more like in Baseline than in GR-
Pre and GR-Inter where the resolution of the global risk precedes the
resolution of the decision risk.
The findings of this section can be summarized as follows.
SUMMARY
− While compound independence cannot be rejected in GR-Post, the
isolation effect is violated in GR-Inter.
− Timing independence cannot be rejected.
− Full investment seems higher in the presence of global risk.
− The same affect model helps explain investment in Baseline and
GR-Inter, showing similar coefficients for anticipated rejoicing (+),
experienced hope (+), and experienced irritation (−).
− Affect functions differently in GR-Pre and GR-Post. Only antici-
pated rejoicing is (positively) correlated with investment in both.
In addition, experienced irritation is found to be correlated with
investment in GR-Post, but with a positive sign.
− On average, across treatments, participants are similarly motivated
by anticipated regret and rejoicing, but the relation with invest-
ment differs. Another indicator showing that, affectively, treat-
ments are appraised as being different is that the experience of
hope and anxiety is of higher intensity in GR-Pre and GR-Inter
where a global risk (arguably the more dramatic risk) is present
but resolved before the resolution of the decision risk.
− Estimated regret from a bad outcome of the decision risk does not
differ across treatments. The regret that is actually experienced is
overestimated.
Hopfensitz_van-Winden.tex; 8/02/2007; 14:27; p.21
22
4. Discussion and Further Evidence
Our results are surprisingly different from the findings of the two most
related studies: Cubitt et al, (1998) and Bosman and van Winden
(2005). In contrast with the former study, we find evidence against
the isolation effect but not against the principle of timing indepen-
dence. Furthermore, we do not find that people invest less in GR-Post,
compared to Baseline, which contrasts with the latter study. How to ex-
plain these behavioral differences? Because of our multiple findings that
(anticipated and experienced) emotions play a role in the investment
decision, we conjecture that factors influencing emotional intensity (like
vividness or closeness), which have not been controlled for in these
studies, may have affected the results. To substantiate this claim we
will focus on the difference between our findings and those of Bosman
and van Winden (in the sequel, indicated as BvW), concerning GR-
Post. Two potentially important issues will be addressed: the influence
of emotion measures and the amount of money that is at stake.32
As acknowledged in the psychological literature (e.g. Lerner and
Keltner (2001)), emotion measures may influence affect, and thereby
behavior, by inducing people to focus on their emotional experience.
Because only in our study emotion measures were applied before the
investment decision was made33, this may partly explain the different
results. For example, it may be that the Spielberger questionnaires used
to measure (trait and state) anxiety have contributed to the anxiety and
irritation that participants experienced. If so, this could explain why we
observe less investment in Baseline and more in GR-Post than Bosman
and van Winden.34 To check out this potential effect, we replicated
Baseline and GR-Post, omitting the self-report measures in the lab
prior to the taking of the decision. These new treatments will be labelled
Baseline-without and GR-Post-without.
The second issue to be examined concerns the amount of working
money (stake size). In all our treatments we endowed the participants
with 15 euro as working money, to be allocated to the two projects
in multiples of 50 eurocent. This was based on the 30 guilders used by
Bosman and van Winden (2005) in their global risk experiment (similar
to our GR-Post) – where participants had to allocate the money in
multiples of one guilder – and an exchange rate of approximately 2 to
1. However, we have the impression that people may have perceived
the 15 euro as being of less value, and perhaps more like 15 guilders35.
Therefore, we also replicated Baseline and GR-Post using an endow-
ment of 30 euro (to be allocated in multiples of 1 euro). These two new
treatments will be labelled Baseline-high and GR-Post-high.36
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Figure 6. INVESTMENT in Baseline[GR-Post]-without and Base-
line[GR-Post]-high.
4.1. Further Evidence on Investment Behavior
Investment behavior in the additional treatments is shown in Figure
6. We focus first on Baseline-without and GR-Post-without. There are
indications of a distributional shift in the direction of BvW: a shift to-
wards higher investment in Baseline-without and towards lower invest-
ment in GR-Post-without, with modal investment coinciding now at
2/3 and a less pronounced difference in the frequency of full investment.
As in BvW, adding the global risk seems to negatively affect investment,
albeit that the difference is not significant in this case (Mann-Whitney,
p = 0.530).37 Thus, the additional emotion measures applied immedi-
ately before the investment decision seem (partly) responsible for the
divergence in findings.
One finding of BvW is still missing, which is the inverted-U shaped
investment distribution (over the interval [1/3, 1]) in case of the global
risk. Interestingly, this phenomenon shows up if we turn to the treat-
ments with the higher stake: Baseline-high and GR-Post-high. In GR-
Post-high there is crowding out of investment in the open interval
(1/3, 1), with a remarkable downward shift in modal investment (from
1 to 1/3), generating a clear U-shaped investment distribution.38 With
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the exception of the mode in Baseline-high being at 1/3 instead of 2/3,
the results of the high treatments look very similar to the ones obtained
by BvW.
OBSERVATION 1. The measurement of emotions immediately before
the investment decision, together with a different amount of money
being at stake, seems responsible for our finding that in contrast to BvW
investment in GR-Post is not significantly lower than in Baseline.
4.2. Further Evidence on the Role of Emotions
The Tobit model of investment that is successful in explaining invest-
ment in Baseline and GR-Inter but not in GR-Pre and GR-Post, is
again helpful for the new treatments Baseline-high and GR-Post-high
where also experienced emotions were measured before the investment
decision (see Appendix C). In the former, the coefficients of experienced
hope and anticipated rejoicing are again significant and of very similar
magnitude as in Baseline. The main difference is experienced irritation,
the coefficient of which is no longer (weakly) significant. Interestingly,
in contrast with GR-Post, the model is significant for GR-Post-high.
It shows a larger and significant coefficient for anticipated rejoicing.
While the coefficient of experienced irritation is again positive and has
kept almost exactly the same size, its significance has dropped to the
20% level. Apparently, the larger stake in these treatments diminishes
the role of irritation.
Because we do not find clear statistical evidence of a difference in
the investment distributions of the respective high and lower stake
treatments, we further mention the regression results of grouping the
observations from the lower and higher stakes treatments, labelled
Baseline-grouped and GR-Post-grouped. Both models are highly signifi-
cant (prob > chi2 = 0.000). Regarding Baseline-grouped we find similar
coefficients as before for experienced hope and anticipated rejoicing
(hope: 0.220, p = 0.000; REJOICE-R: 0.097, p = 0.000), while the
coefficient of experienced irritation is again insignificant (as in Baseline-
high). For GR-Post-grouped we find that the coefficient of anticipated
rejoicing is closer to the one obtained in Gr-Post-high (REJOICE-R:
0.127, p = 0.000), while the coefficient of experienced irritation is as
before, but is now clearly significant (irritation: 0.133, p = 0.018).39
Surprisingly, so far we have not found any direct evidence of an
effect of (trait and state) anxiety. Neither for trait-anxiety nor for state-
anxiety differences between the treatments are found (Kruskal-Wallis,
p > 0.202).40 Only for Baseline-grouped (now including Baseline-
without) we find a (weakly) significant negative correlation between
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trait-anxiety and investment if, in addition, investment is categorized
into low, middle, and high investment (Spearman, −0.171, p = 0.064).
Another piece of evidence, this time concerning state-anxiety, is ob-
tained from a linear regression with the finally confirmed (and some-
times changed) investment level as dependent variable and, as indepen-
dent variables, INVESTMENT and ANXIETY-2 (anxiety experienced
after the investment decision, but before confirmation). Using the data
of Baseline-grouped and GR-Post-grouped, with in both cases six par-
ticipants who changed their decision, we find for the former as well
as the latter a negative effect of ANXIETY-2.41 Interestingly, the ef-
fect of state-anxiety vanishes completely if ANXIETY-1, instead of
ANXIETY-2, is used.
RESULT 7. The Tobit investment model is helpful also for explain-
ing investment in the additional treatments (Baseline-high and GR-
Post-high) and if treatments are grouped together (Baseline-grouped and
GR-Post-grouped). The coefficients of anticipated rejoicing, experienced
hope, and experienced irritation are quite similar in Baseline, Baseline-
high and Baseline-grouped, as well as in GR-Post, GR-Post-high and
GR-Post-grouped. The only exception concerns irritation in the base-
line treatments (which loses the weak significance it had in Baseline).
Finally, using grouped observations we also find some weak evidence of
a negative effect of trait and state anxiety on investment.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we presented a comprehensive study aimed at investigat-
ing decisions under all the possible timing options of a global risk that
can not be influenced by the decision maker. In contrast with earlier
studies neither an isolation effect nor a violation of timing independence
was observed. Regarding the latter, no statistical difference in behavior
was found when comparing the effect of a global risk being resolved
before the decision has to be made with situations where the decision
maker has to decide without yet knowing the outcome of the global
risk. Even though behavior is more or less the same across our global
risk treatments, variations in the affective responses across treatments
were found. It was argued that these differences may very well explain
the conflicting results from earlier experiments.
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Appendix
A. Emotion measures (translated from Dutch)
A.1. State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1970)
A.1.1. STAI-trait
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and then choose the appropriate number to the right
of the statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer
which seems to describe how you generally feel.
almost almost
never always
1. I feel pleasant (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. I tire quickly (1) (2) (3) (4)
3. I feel like crying (1) (2) (3) (4)
4. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be (1) (2) (3) (4)
5. I am losing out on things because I can’t make up
my mind soon enough
(1) (2) (3) (4)
6. I feel rested (1) (2) (3) (4)
7. I am “calm, cool and collected” (1) (2) (3) (4)
8. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot
overcome them
(1) (2) (3) (4)
9. I worry too much over something that really
doesn’t matter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
10. I am happy (1) (2) (3) (4)
11. I am inclined to take things hard (1) (2) (3) (4)
12. I lack self-confidence (1) (2) (3) (4)
13. I feel secure (1) (2) (3) (4)
14. I try to avoid facing a crisis or difficulty (1) (2) (3) (4)
15. I feel blue (1) (2) (3) (4)
16. I am content (1) (2) (3) (4)
17. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind
and bothers me
(1) (2) (3) (4)
18. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put
them out of my mind
(1) (2) (3) (4)
19. I am a steady person (1) (2) (3) (4)
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think
over my recent concerns and interests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: The answers are used to calculate a value between 20 and 80,
representing the anxiety trait of the subject [ANXIETY-trait].
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A.1.2. STAI-state
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and then choose the appropriate number to the right
of the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There
are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement
but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
almost almost
never always
1. I feel calm (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. I feel secure (1) (2) (3) (4)
3. I am tense (1) (2) (3) (4)
4. I am regretful (1) (2) (3) (4)
5. I feel at ease (1) (2) (3) (4)
6. I feel upset (1) (2) (3) (4)
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes (1) (2) (3) (4)
8. I feel rested (1) (2) (3) (4)
9. I feel anxious (1) (2) (3) (4)
10. I feel comfortable (1) (2) (3) (4)
11. I feel self-confident (1) (2) (3) (4)
12. I feel nervous (1) (2) (3) (4)
13. I am jittery (1) (2) (3) (4)
14. I feel “high strung” (1) (2) (3) (4)
15. I am relaxed (1) (2) (3) (4)
16. I feel content (1) (2) (3) (4)
17. I am worried (1) (2) (3) (4)
18. I feel over-excited and “rattled” (1) (2) (3) (4)
19. I feel joyful (1) (2) (3) (4)
20. I feel pleasant (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: The answers are used to calculate a value between 20 and 80,
representing the anxiety state at that moment in time. [ANXIETY-
1][ANXIETY-2]
In the experiment the validated Dutch translation of the STAI was used
(van der Ploeg et al., 1980).
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A.2. Regret
A.2.1. Anticipated regret and rejoicing
To which extent are the following remarks for your decision applicable?
not at very
all much so
1. For project A: I did not put more money in A,
because I did not want to feel really bad when
project B ends well (wins). regret as motivation
for project B [REGRET-B]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2. For project A: I did not put less money in A,
because I will feel really good if project B returns
nothing (loses). rejoicing as motivation for project
A [REJOICE-A]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3. For project B: I did not put less money in B,
because I will feel really good if project B ends
well (wins). rejoicing as motivation for project B
[REJOICE-B]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4. For project B: I did not put more money in
B, because I did not want to feel really bad
when project B returns nothing (loses). regret as
motivation for project A [REGRET-A]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: Comments in italics and brackets were not included in the ques-
tionnaire and refer to the descriptions made in the text.
To account for relative importance of regret and rejoicing we define:
REGRET-R = REGRET-A − REGRET-B
REJOICE-R = REJOICE-B − REJOICE-A
A.2.2. Estimated regret and disappointment
We ask you now to think about the money that you invested in project B (no matter
how much it was). Imagine that you roll the white dice and that you get a 5. Which
means that you lost the money that you had invested in project B. How do you feel
then?
not at very
all much so
1. Feel powerless? (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. Feel that you should have known better? (1) (2) (3) (4)
3. Feel the tendency to kick myself? (1) (2) (3) (4)
4. Feel the tendency to get away from the situation? (1) (2) (3) (4)
5. Want to undo the event? (1) (2) (3) (4)
6. Want to do nothing? (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: Items 2, 3 and 5 measured [REGRET-E], the remaining items
measured [DISAPP-E] (Zeelenberg et al., 1998).
Hopfensitz_van-Winden.tex; 8/02/2007; 14:27; p.28
Dynamic Choice, Independence and Emotions 29
A.2.3. Experienced regret
Please answer the following questions:
not at very
all much so
1. Are you disappointed by the outcome? (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. Do you regret your decision? (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: The answers give [REGRET-X] and [DISAPP-X].
A.3. Other Emotions
A.3.1. Experienced emotions:
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and then choose the appropriate number to the right
of the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There
are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement
but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
not at very
all much so
1. I feel surprised (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. I feel hopeful (1) (2) (3) (4)
3. I feel sad (1) (2) (3) (4)
4. I feel happy (1) (2) (3) (4)
5. I feel irritated (1) (2) (3) (4)
A.3.2. Importance of emotions for decision
At the end of the second questionnaire for STAI state, the following
question was asked, to determine if subjects took emotions into account
when making their decision:
Was your decision influenced by how you might feel after the rolling of the white
dice, which will determine the outcome of project B? [EMOTION]
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B. Instructions
Translated from the Dutch
B.1. Announcement of Global Risk
B.1.1. GR-Pre
Announcement earnings: At the start of phase 2 of this ex-
periment there is a chance of 1/3 that you will lose all your
working money and thus can’t earn money.
Each participant has received with this announcement a red die. At
the start of phase 2, thus before deciding about the distribution of the
working money, each participant will be asked to roll this die a single
time under supervision. If the die shows 5 or 6, you will lose all your
working money. If the die shows 1, 2, 3 or 4, you will keep your
working money. Please note, your earnings depend on the decision that
you will take now, in phase 2, and on you keeping your working money.
B.1.2. GR-Inter
Announcement earnings: At the start of phase 3 of this ex-
periment there is a chance of 1/3 that you will lose all your
possible earnings.
Each participant has received with this announcement a red die. At
the start of phase 3, thus before the outcome of the projects is deter-
mined, each participant will be asked to roll this die a single time under
supervision. If the die shows 5 or 6, you will lose all your possible
earnings. If the die shows 1, 2, 3 or 4, you will keep your possible
earnings. Please note, your earnings depend on the decision that you
will take now, in phase 2.
B.1.3. GR-Post
Announcement earnings: At the end of phase 3 of this ex-
periment there is a chance of 1/3 that you will lose all your
earnings.
Each participant has received with this announcement a red die. After
the end of the phase 3, thus after the outcome of the projects is deter-
mined, each participant will be asked to roll this die a single time under
supervision. If the die shows 5 or 6, you will lose all your earnings.
If the die shows 1, 2, 3 or 4, you will keep your earnings. Please note,
your earnings depend on the decision that you will take now, in phase
2.
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B.2. General instructions
Information about projects
In this phase you have to make a single decision concerning your work-
ing money. You have to allocate the 15 euro [30 euro] that you received
over two projects. These projects will be labelled on the computer
screen, when you make your decision, with the letters A and B.
In project A you will get for every euro that you put into this project,
one euro. Thus, project A always gives a certain return. For the amount
that you put in project B the following holds. With probability one half
(1/2) you will lose this amount and with probability one half (1/2) you
will receive two and a half (2 1/2) times this amount.
You can allocate your working money in multiples of 50 eurocent
over the projects A and B in any possible combination that sums up to
15 euro [30 euro]. The table below shows for each possible combination
that you can choose the returns and corresponding probabilities. All
values are in euros.
B.2.1. Baseline
In the following phase, chance will determine for you the returns of
project B. Each participant has just received a white die. In the next
phase everyone will be asked to throw this die a single time under
supervision. Also if you have put nothing in project B, you will have to
throw the die. If the die shows 1, 2 or 3, you will receive two and a half
(2 1/2) times the amount that you put in project B. If the die shows
4, 5 or 6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project B.
B.2.2. GR-Pre
Before you will take your decision, you will be confronted with the risk
of losing all your working money. Note: if this happens to you we still
ask you to take a decision concerning the distribution of your working
money over the projects (but you will not be paid out the earnings
from the projects).
In the following phase, chance will determine for you the returns
of project B. Each participant has just received a white die. In the
next phase everyone will be asked to throw this die a single time under
supervision. Also if you have put nothing in project B, you will have to
throw the die. If the die shows 1, 2 or 3, you will receive two and a half
(2 1/2) times the amount that you put in project B. If the die shows
4, 5 or 6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project B.
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B.2.3. GR-Inter
At the beginning of the following phase, thus after you made your
decision but before the outcome of projects is determined, you will be
confronted with the risk of losing all your earnings. Only for those that
keep their possible earnings the following will then hold: Chance will
determine for you the returns of project B. Each participant has just
received a white die. In the next phase everyone will be asked to throw
this die a single time under supervision. Also if you have put nothing
in project B, you will have to throw the die. If the die shows 1, 2 or 3,
you will receive two and a half (2 1/2) times the amount that you put
in project B. If the die shows 4, 5 or 6, you will lose the amount that
you have put in project B.
B.2.4. GR-Post
In the following phase, chance will determine for you the returns of
project B. Each participant has just received a white die. In the next
phase everyone will be asked to throw this die a single time under
supervision. Also if you have put nothing in project B, you will have
to throw the die. If the die shows 1, 2 or 3, you will receive two and
a half (2 1/2) times the amount that you put in project B. If the die
shows 4, 5 or 6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project
B. At the end of the following phase, thus after the outcome from the
projects is decided, you will be confronted with the risk of losing all
your earnings.
Money in Money in Certain Chance of 1/2 for extra
project A: project B: return earnings of
0.00 15.00 0.00 37.50
0.50 14.50 0.50 36.25
1.00 14.00 1.00 35.00
1.50 13.50 1.50 33.75
2.00 13.00 2.00 32.50
...
...
...
...
13.50 1.50 13.50 3.75
14.00 1.00 14.00 2.50
14.50 0.50 14.50 1.25
15.00 0.00 15.00 0.00
Note: Full table was presented to subjects.
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C. Tables
Table V. Censored tobit regressions of investment on emotions
GR-Pre Number of obs 48
LR χ2(5) 8.08
Prob > χ2 0.152
1 obs. left-censored; 11 obs. right-censored Cox Snell R2 0.155
invest t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t|
ANXIETY-trait -0.003 0.006 0.645
ANXIETY-1 -0.002 0.005 0.701
HOPE-1 0.052 0.081 0.526
IRRITATE-1 -0.037 0.081 0.649
REJOICE-R 0.080 0.034 0.024
Intercept 0.638 0.435 0.150
GR-Post Number of obs 42
LR χ2(5) 6.40
Prob > χ2 0.269
1 obs. left-censored; 10 obs. right-censored Cox Snell R2 0.141
invest t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t|
ANXIETY-trait 0.004 0.007 0.641
ANXIETY-1 -0.002 0.007 0.753
HOPE-1 0.079 0.088 0.378
IRRITATE-1 0.130 0.072 0.078
REJOICE-R 0.080 0.050 0.119
Intercept 0.137 0.446 0.761
Baseline-high Number of obs 39
LR χ2(5) 10.35
Prob > χ2 0.066
1 obs. left-censored; 6 obs. right-censored Cox Snell R2 0.233
invest t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t|
ANXIETY-trait 0.001 0.006 0.841
ANXIETY-1 0.003 0.006 0.547
HOPE-1 0.234 0.088 0.012
IRRITATE-1 -0.014 0.099 0.891
REJOICE-R 0.108 0.042 0.014
Intercept -0.395 0.447 0.383
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Table VI. Censored tobit regressions of investment on emotions
GR-Post-high Number of obs 29
LR χ2(5) 23.75
Prob > χ2 0.000
1 obs. left-censored; 7 obs. right-censored Cox Snell R2 0.559
invest t1 Coef. Std. Err. P > |t|
ANXIETY-trait -0.002 0.007 0.746
ANXIETY-1 0.000 0.006 0.999
HOPE-1 0.082 0.081 0.317
IRRITATE-1 0.133 0.101 0.200
REJOICE-R 0.153 0.028 0.000
Intercept 0.119 0.443 0.791
Table VII. Spearman correlations for anxiety, hope and irritation
Baseline grouped ANXIETY-trait ANXIETY-1 HOPE-1
ANXIETY-1 0.539
(p = 0.000)
HOPE-1 -0.237 -0.391
(p = 0.039) (p = 0.001)
IRRITATE-1 0.253 0.333 -0.187
(p = 0.028) (p = 0.003) (p = 0.106)
GR-Post grouped ANXIETY-trait ANXIETY-1 HOPE-1
ANXIETY-1 0.320
(p = 0.007)
HOPE-1 -0.181 0.010
(p = 0.132) (p = 0.932)
IRRITATE-1 0.239 0.212 -0.340
GR-Post-low (p = 0.212) (p = 0.178) (p = 0.027)
GR-Post-high 0.246 0.153 -0.128
(p = 0.116) (p = 0.430) (p = 0.509)
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Table VIII. Overview of investment behavior from all treatments (t1).
N mean: fraction [points] std. dev.: fraction [points]
Baseline 37 0.521 [7.811] 0.226 [3.386]
Baseline-high 39 0.533 [16.00] 0.249 [7.459]
Baseline-without 43 0.584 [8.756] 0.234 [3.506]
GR-Pre 48 0.606 [9.083] 0.258 [3.865]
GR-Inter 39 0.662 [9.923] 0.274 [4.106]
GR-Post 42 0.623 [9.345] 0.273 [4.091]
GR-Post-high 29 0.554 [16.62] 0.306 [9.186]
GR-Post-without 40 0.575 [8.625] 0.253 [3.796]
Table IX. Significance levels for differences in investment.
Mann-Whitney Kolm.-Smirnov
Prob > |z| p
Baseline vs Baseline-high 0.859 0.600
Baseline-without 0.105 0.224
GR-Pre 0.117 0.454
GR-Inter 0.011 0.012
GR-Post 0.062 0.103
GR-Post-high 0.845 0.229
GR-Post-without 0.378 0.653
Baseline-high vs Baseline-without 0.121 0.132
GR-Pre 0.154 0.086
GR-Inter 0.025 0.031
GR-Post 0.087 0.197
GR-Post-high 0.830 0.738
GR-Post-without 0.337 0.409
Baseline-without vs GR-Pre 0.939 0.900
GR-Inter 0.156 0.114
GR-Post 0.620 0.680
GR-Post-high 0.279 0.035
GR-Post-without 0.530 0.851
GR-Pre vs GR-Inter 0.247 0.312
GR-Post 0.653 0.949
GR-Post-high 0.276 0.039
GR-Post-without 0.548 0.954
GR-Inter vs GR-Post 0.495 0.676
GR-Post-high 0.129 0.026
GR-Post-without 0.103 0.161
GR-Post vs GR-Post-high 0.196 0.092
GR-Post-without 0.341 0.699
GR-Post-high vs GR-Post-without 0.431 0.151
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Notes
1 Such risk concerns a specific case of “background risk” (see e.g. Gollier, 2001).
2 Alternatively, we could have followed the common procedure to present this
decision problem as a binary choice problem concerning the prospects (A): (z) and
(B): (2.5 × z, 0.5), with (B) having the higher expected value. As will be shown
below, however, this would have obscured the fact that most participants definitely
did not perceive our problem as a binary choice problem.
3 According to Robinson and Clore (2002) self-reports are “the most common and
potentially the best way to measure a person’s emotional experience”.
4 It seems that regret and rejoicing are not simply opposites of each other (Con-
nolly and Zeelenberg, 2002). In our experiment we will therefore measure both
emotions.
5 Only subjects that indicate that they took their emotions into account while
making their decision (represented by the variable EMOTION in the table), are
asked about anticipated regret and rejoicing.
6 For example, the experiment as a whole may be considered as a single dynamic
choice problem or additional incentive effects may be induced through the accu-
mulation of earnings. Note, furthermore, that applying a random lottery incentive
procedure would in fact change the Baseline problem to a problem of type GR-Inter
(see Cubitt et al., 1998).
7 Participants that lost were requested to remain seated till the experiment was
over and to answer the money allocation question hypothetically.
8 Note that participants were not aware of this option when they made their
investment decision. Only very few participants changed their investment decision
(altogether 9).
9 See note 5 on the problematic nature of the latter procedure.
10 All tests in this paper are two-sided.
11 We find no effect of age, field of study (economics or not), and previous ex-
perience with economic experiments. In total only three subjects changed their
investment when they had to confirm their investment decision. Therefore, in the
sequel we will focus on the initial investment decision.
12 Anticipated rejoicing was only measured for subjects responding “yes” to EMO-
TION. If the answer was “no” REJOICE-R is set to equal to 0.
13 We do not include REGRET-R because in both treatments REGRET-R and
REJOICE-R are strongly negatively correlated (Spearman: −0.560, p = 0.000) and,
as will be shown below, both variables can account for the same effect.
14 The mean intensity score for HOPE-1 equals 2.946 in Baseline and 3.282 in
GR-Inter (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.018) .
15 The mean intensity score for IRRITATE-1 (REJOICE-R) equals 1.459 (0.412)
in Baseline and 1.846 (0.450) in GR-Inter. For REGRET-R the respective values are
0.471 and 0.450. (Mann-Whitney, regret: p = 0.820; rejoicing: p = 0.834; irritation:
p = 0.071)
16 ANXIETY-1−ANXIETY-trait equals 5.385 in GR-Inter vs. 0.324 in Baseline
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0.043).
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17 In their terminology, the “scaled-up problem” vs. the “precommitment problem”
and the “prior problem”, respectively.
18 Investment of those who lost and could give only hypothetical answers is higher
(mean: 0.68, std. dev: 0.27), but the difference is not significant (Mann-Whitney,
p = 0.266).
19 The distribution of ANXIETY-trait in our experiment (all treatments: mean:
35.74, std. dev: 8.16) is very similar to the one observed in a psychology experiment
at the same university, involving 493 subjects (mean: 35.29, std. dev: 9.69) (t-test,
p = 0.569).
20 Controlling for trait-anxiety by taking the difference ANXIETY-1−ANXIETY-
trait, we find for Baseline: 0.32, and for GR-Pre: 5.71 (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.020).
21 HOPE-1 equals 2.95 in Baseline vs. 3.35 in GR-Pre (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.003).
22 In all treatments experienced happiness is approximately 2.8 (Kruskal-Wallis,
p = 0.932).
23 There is also no correlation between happiness and investment in the other
treatments (Spearman, approx. −0.02, p > 0.829). Interestingly, though, sadness is
negatively correlated with investment in GR-Pre (Spearman, −0.379, p = 0.008),
whereas no correlation is observed in the other treatments (Spearman, approx.
−0.06, p > 0.597).
24 If we substitute certainty equivalents at nodes and then calculate backwards
(Segal, 1990), compared to Baseline, similar investment would be predicted for GR-
Inter and for GR-Post (or possibly more for the latter; see Bosman and van Winden,
2005). The global risk should have no effect in GR-Inter, as is easily seen from the
decision tree. In contrast, we have observed a substantial increase in investment in
GR-Inter.
25 In contrast, Bosman and van Winden (2005) find a similar fraction of full
investment for both their baseline and ’post’ treatment. We will return to this below.
26 A similar result is obtained if irritation is directly correlated with investment
(Spearman, +0.259, p = 0.099).
27 See note 5.
28 We cannot reject that REGRET-A (B) and REJOICE-A (B) are from the same
distribution across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis, p > 0.180).
29 For the correlations of estimated and experienced regret (REGRET-E and
REGRET-X) and disappointment (DISAPP-E and DISAPP-X) we consider only
participants who actually lost with project B and survived the global risk.
30 Experienced regret and disappointment are correlated with the amount of money
the participant lost due to the negative outcome of the relevant risk. In all treat-
ments, if money was lost due to the decision risk, regret is experienced (Spearman,
≈ 0.35, p < 0.064). For GR-Inter and GR-Post, we also find correlations between
disappointment and the loss of money due to the global risk (Spearman, ≈ 0.55,
p < 0.000).
31 Regressing experienced regret on estimated regret shows a coefficient smaller
than 1.
32 For completeness sake, we mention two more differences with the design of
Bosman and van Winden. First, in their study subjects had to put the bills and coins
of their endowment in two cups on their table, whereas in our case the allocation
decision was made on the computer. Second, in our GR-Post the resolution of the
global risk took place in the lab, immediately after the resolution of the decision
risk, while in the study of Bosman and van Winden this happened when participants
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were (individually) paid out. Finally, remember that in our case participants started
with filling out the ANXIETY-trait questionnaire in the reception room, before they
entered the lab.
33 Cubitt et al. (1998) did not measure emotions at all, while Bosman and van
Winden only used self-reports after the investment decision.
34 Because anxiety in Baseline might lead to less risk taking, while additional
anxiety in GR-Post might have the opposite effect.
35 Even though a study by Koebberling et al. (2004) suggests no effect of the
change from guilders to euros.
36 Experimental procedures were the same as for Baseline-low and GR-Post-low.
However, in the without treatments participants did not have to fill out the
ANXIETY-1 questionnaire and were not asked about experienced emotions before
they had to make their decision. In total, 151 students participated. Participants
received again 2.50 euro as show-up fee, while their average earnings were 14 euro
(approximately $17) in the without treatments and 36 euro (approximately $44) in
the high treatments.
37 Excluding extreme (full) investment, the difference becomes significant at the
20% level (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.166). Comparing the without treatments with the
respective earlier treatments, we find weak evidence of a difference for Baseline and
Baseline-without, using a Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.105).
38 Compared to the lower stake treatments, we find weak evidence of a difference
in distributions for GR-Post and GR-Post-high, using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(p = 0.092).
39 The different role played by irritation across these treatments also shows up in
the fact that it is not correlated with (both trait and state) anxiety in GR-Post-
grouped whereas there is a positive correlation in Baseline-grouped.
40 The difference ANXIETY-1 − ANXIETY-trait is on average larger in the high
treatments (2.410 vs. 0.324 in Baseline; 2.966 vs. 0.905 in GR-Post). This difference
seems to point at some higher arousal in the treatments with a larger stake, in line
with emotion theory.
41 Regression coefficients and significance for Baseline-grouped (N = 119): in-
vestment, 0.966 (p = 0.000); ANXIETY-2, −0.002 (p = 0.000); intercept, 0.074
(p = 0.000). Same for GR-Post-grouped (N = 111): investment, 1.000 (p = 0.000);
ANXIETY-2, −0.001 (p = 0.046); intercept, 0.033, (p = 0.042). In both cases, the
without treatment is included.
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